Abstract. We present a constructive proof of Brouwer's fixed point theorem with sequentially at most one fixed point, and apply it to the mini-max theorem of zero-sum games.
Introduction
It is well known that Brouwer's fixed point theorem can not be constructively proved 1 . Sperner's lemma which is used to prove Brouwer's theorem, however, can be constructively proved. Some authors have presented an approximate version of Brouwer's theorem using Sperner's lemma. See [8] and [9] . Thus, Brouwer's fixed point theorem is constructively, in the sense of constructive mathematicsá la Bishop, proved in its approximate version.
Also in [8] Dalen states a conjecture that a uniformly continuous function f from a simplex to itself, with property that each open set contains a point x such that x = f (x), which means |x − f (x)| > 0, and also at every point x on the boundaries of the simplex x = f (x), has an exact fixed point. In this note we present a partial answer to Dalen's conjecture.
Recently [2] showed that the following theorem is equivalent to Brouwer's fan theorem.
Each uniformly continuous function ϕ from a compact metric space X into itself with at most one fixed point and approximate fixed points has a fixed point. By reference to the notion of sequentially at most one maximum in [1] we require a stronger condition that a function ϕ has sequentially at most one fixed point, and will show the following result.
Each uniformly continuous function ϕ from a compact metric space X into itself with sequentially at most one fixed point and approximate fixed points has a fixed point, without the fan theorem. In [7] Orevkov constructed a computably coded continuous function f from the unit square to itself, which is defined at each computable point of the square, such that f has no computable fixed point. His map consists of a retract of the computable elements of the square to its boundary followed by a rotation of the boundary of the square. As pointed out by Hirst in [5] , since there is no retract of the square to its boundary, his map does not have a total extension.
In the next section we present our theorem and its proof. In Section 3, as an application of the theorem we consider the mini-max theorem of two-person zerosum games.
Theorem and proof
Let p be a point in a compact metric space X, and consider a uniformly continuous function ϕ from X into itself. According to [8] and [9] ϕ has an approximate fixed point. It means For each ε > 0 there exists p ∈ X such that |p − ϕ(p)| < ε.
Since ε > 0 is arbitrary, inf
The notion that ϕ has at most one fixed point is defined as follows;
Next by reference to the notion of sequentially at most one maximum in [1] , we define the notion that ϕ has sequentially at most one fixed point as follows; Definition 2 (Sequentially at most one fixed point). All sequences (p n ) n≥1 , (q n ) n≥1 in X such that |ϕ(p n ) − p n | −→ 0 and |ϕ(q n ) − q n | −→ 0 are eventually close in the sense that |p n − q n | −→ 0. Now we show the following lemma. Lemma 1. Let ϕ be a uniformly continuous function from a compact metric space X into itself. Assume inf p∈X |p − ϕ(p)| = 0. If the following property holds, For each δ > 0 there exists ε > 0 such that if p, q ∈ X, |ϕ(p)−p| < ε and |ϕ(q) − q| < ε, then |p − q| ≤ δ, then, there exists a point r ∈ X such that ϕ(r) = r, that is , we have a fixed point of ϕ.
is a Cauchy sequence in X, and converges to a limit r ∈ X. The continuity of ϕ yields |ϕ(r) − r| = 0, that is, ϕ(r) = r.
Next we show the following theorem. Theorem 1. Each uniformly continuous function ϕ from a compact metric space X into itself with sequentially at most one fixed point and approximate fixed points has a fixed point Proof. Choose a sequence (r n ) n≥1 in X such that |ϕ(r n ) − r n | −→ 0. In view of Lemma 1 it is enough to prove that the following condition holds.
For each δ > 0 there exists ε > 0 such that if p, q ∈ X, |ϕ(p)−p| < ε and |ϕ(q) − q| < ε, then |p − q| ≤ δ.
Assume that the set K = {(p, q) ∈ X × X : |p − q| ≥ δ} is nonempty and compact
2
. Since the mapping (p, q) −→ max(|ϕ(p)−p|, |ϕ(q)−q|) is uniformly continuous, we can construct an increasing binary sequence (λ n ) n≥1 such that
It suffices to find n such that λ n = 1. In that case, if
−n , and if λ n = 1, set
Computing N such that |p N − q N | < δ, we must have λ N = 1. We have completed the proof.
Application: Minimax theorem of zero-sum games
Consider a two person zero-sum game. There are two players A and B. Player A has m alternative pure strategies, and the set of his pure strategies is denoted by S A = {a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a m }. Player B has n alternative pure strategies, and the set of his pure strategies is denoted by S B = {b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n }. m and n are finite natural numbers. The payoff of player A when a combination of players' strategies is (a i , b j ) is denoted by M (a i , b j ). Since we consider a zero-sum game, the payoff of player B is equal to −M (a i , b j ). Let p i be a probability that A chooses his strategy a i , and q j be a probability that B chooses his strategy b j . A mixed strategy of A is represented by a probability distribution over S A , and is denoted by p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p m ) with m i=1 p i = 1. Similarly, a mixed strategy of B is denoted by q = (q 1 , q 2 , . . . , q n ) with n j=1 q j = 1. A combination of mixed strategies (p, q) is called a profile. The expected payoff of player A at a profile (p, q) is written as follows,
We assume that M (a i , b j ) is finite. Then, since M (p, q) is linear with respect to probability distributions over the sets of pure strategies of players, it is a uniformly continuous function. The expected payoff of A when he chooses a pure strategy a i and B chooses a mixed strategy q is M (a i , q) = n j=1 M (a i , b j )q j , and his expected payoff when he chooses a mixed strategy p and B chooses a pure strategy
The set of all mixed strategies of A is denoted by P , and that of B is denoted by Q. P is an m − 1-dimensional simplex, and Q is an n − 1-dimensional simplex.
We call v A (p) = inf q M (p, q) the guaranteed payoff of A at p. And we define v * A as follows,
This is a constructive version of the maximin payoff. Similarly, we call v B (q) = sup p M (p, q) the guaranteed payoff of player B at q, and define v * B as follows,
This is a constructive version of the minimax payoff. For a fixed p we have inf q M (p, q) ≤ M (p, q) for all q, and so
We assume the following condition;
for all i and j are eventually close in the sense that
Thus, Γ has sequentially at most one fixed point.
Summing up p
Similarly, summing up q
) is a uniformly continuous function from P × Q into itself. There are m + n − 2 independent vectors in P ×Q, and so P ×Q is an m+n−2-dimensional space. Since it is a product of two simplices, it is a compact subset of a metric space. Therefore, Γ has a fixed point. Let (p,q) be the fixed point, and λ = 
With (1) we obtain v * A = v * B . Therefore, the value of the game is determined at the fixed point of Γ. Table 1 . It is an example of the so-called Matching-Pennies game. Pure strategies of Player 1 and 2 are X and Y . The left side number in each cell represents the payoff of Player 1 and the right side number represents the payoff of Player 2. Let p X and 1 − p X denote the probabilities that Player 1 chooses, respectively, X and Y , and q X and 1 − q X denote the probabilities for Player 2. Denote the expected payoff of Player 1 by M (p X , q X ). Since we consider a zero-sum game, the expected payoff of Player 2 is −M (p X , q X ). Then, M (p X , q X ) = p X q X − (1 − p X )q X − p X (1 − q X ) + (1 − p X )(1 − q X ) = (2p X − 1)(2q X − 1)
Denote the payoff of Player 1 when he chooses X by M (X, q X ), and that when he chooses Y by M (Y, q X ). Similarly for Player B. Then, M (X, q X ) = 2q X −1, M (Y, q X ) = 1−2q X , −M (p X , X) = 1−2p X , −M (p X , Y ) = 2p X −1.
And we have
When q X > 1 2 , M (X, q X ) > M (Y, q X ) and M (X, q X ) > M (p X , q X ) for p X < 1, Consider sequences (p X (m)) m≥1 and (q X (m)) m≥1 , and let 0 < ε < 1 2 , 0 < δ < ε. There are the following cases.
(1) (a) If p X (m) > 
